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Abstract 
This paper analyses the impact of Brexit on devolved competences in environmental 
protection. It maps the post-Brexit division of the United Kingdom ;UKͿ͛s internal (devolved) 
and external (international) competences and how this may shift when competences are 
returned from the European Union (EU). Crucially, the paper suggests that certain of these 
EU powers do not simply derive from the EU but are in fact already held by the devolved 
regions in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity. Consequently, devolved 
competences are under threat of being pre-empted, as the UK seeks to harmonise 
otherwise fragmented policies and legislation in order to comply with obligations at 
international level. This conundrum is illustrated here using a case study on genetically 
modified crop cultivation, which identifies the conflicts in the UK͛s proclaimed strategy post-
Brexit between international obligations and devolved competences and the legal 
challenges this entails. 
 
Keywords 
Devolution, competences, subsidiarity, pre-emption, multi-level governance, genetically 
modified organisms 
 
Introduction 
The UK is striving to ͚regaiŶ poǁers͛ previously lost to Brussels by withdrawing from the 
European Union (EU). 1  A common presumption is that such powers are external 
competences currently administered by EU institutions, which are due to be reintegrated 
into the UK legal framework post-Brexit.2 However, as this paper will show, this assumption 
is a rather over-simplified picture which does not show the true complexity of legal 
obligations both internal and external to the UK. 
                                                 
* Both authors are Lecturers at Cardiff University, School of Law and Politics (Email: EngelA@cardiff.ac.uk and 
PetetinL@cardiff.ac.uk). 
1 See generally, M. Dougan (ed.), The UK After Brexit: Legal and Policy Challenges (Insentia: Cambridge, 2017). 
2 The slogan ͚take back ĐoŶtrol͛ was widely used by Leave campaigners leading up to the referendum in June 
2016, see e.g. <http://www.voteleavetakecontrol.org/briefing_control.html>. 
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Internally, according to the UK͛s devolution settlements,3 certain competences (for 
example environmental protection and agriculture) have been transferred to the devolved 
administrations of Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland, which have thus become direct 
beneficiaries of rights derived from EU law under the principle of subsidiarity.4 Arguably, 
such rights should be returned to the devolved regions after Brexit with the help of internal 
instruments, meaning that the devolved regions would regain those powers. However, 
recent policy developments indicate that these competences could well be repatriated 
centrally to Westminster, in order to support and strengthen the UK single market and the 
establishment of UK-wide frameworks in these areas. These changes could, however, be 
undertaken to the detriment of sensitive region-specific concerns, such as the environment 
or agriculture. 
Externally, competences are closely intertwined between the EU and other 
international organisations, such as the World Trade Organization (WTO) which continues to 
impose international obligations on the UK beyond its EU membership. In addition, trading 
at international level requires close cooperation and an alignment of certain standards with 
other countries. In particular, any post-Brexit trade deal with the EU will require the UK͛s 
compliance with European standards.5 In addition, even other non-European countries may 
have aligned their trading requirements to those of the EU which could determine further 
legal constraints on the UK͛s external trading.6 
This paper uses a case study on genetically modified (GM) crop cultivation to 
illustrate the complexity of the issues raised by Brexit and how to disentangle the relevant 
international, EU and (sub-)national provisions and mechanisms. Brexit talks have reignited 
public concerns over the UK governance of genetically modified organisms (GMOs).7 
Importantly, the flexibility built into the EU GMO framework was amongst the reasons why 
some commentators identified this framework as the archetype example of multilevel 
governance characteristics.8 To this extent, GMOs could provide further insights on how 
governance within the UK could develop. 
It is well known that genetic modification causes controversy. Such modification is 
said to produce superior crops by eliminating undesirable traits, passing on desirable ones 
through successive generations and improving crop and yield.9 However, GMOs could have 
potentially negative consequences too and the economic, environmental and societal 
                                                 
3 The Northern Ireland Act 1998, the Scotland Act 1998 and the Government of Wales Acts 1998 and 2006 
(hereinafter the devolved settlements). 
4 Art 5 Treaty on European Union (TEU). This will be explained in more detail further below. 
5 See e.g. the international trade agreement between the EU and Canada, Comprehensive Economic and Trade 
Agreement. Full consolidated version of the text can be found online <http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/in-
focus/ceta/ceta-chapter-by-chapter/>. 
6 So-called ͚Brussels effeĐt͛. This is further discussed below. 
7 The Independent, ͚Breǆit: Government to review GM crop regulations in preparation for leaving EU͛ (26 
October 2016) <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/government-review-gm-crop-
regulations-preparation-brexit-european-union-a7381276.html>. 
8 See in particular M. Lee, EU Regulation of GMOs: Law and Decision Making for a New Technology (Edward 
Elgar: Cheltenham, 2008). More generally on new modes of governance, see G. de Búrca and J. Scott, Law and 
New Governance in the EU and the US (Hart Publishing: Oxford, 2006). 
9 See e.g. Consensus Study Report by US National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine: 
͚GeŶetiĐallǇ Engineered Crops: Experiences and ProspeĐts͛ (2016).  
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benefits must be balanced against the possible risks – which is not an easy task given that 
many of the variables are uncertain or unknown.10 GMOs raise further issues beyond 
scientific uncertainty, including ethical, moral and cultural factors. Some consumers 
consider GMOs to be ͚uŶŶatural͛ or resulting in ͚FraŶkeŶfoods͛ which ought to be labelled 
from the moment they are cultivated until they reach the table.11 The whole issue 
surrounding GMOs is brilliantly summarised by Davies: ͚it is not just the risk, or degree of 
risk, that is the issue in GMO debates but the absence of sufficiently good reasons for taking 
the risk͛.12 Hence, it is not just about ͚risk͛ in a technical or scientific sense. Notwithstanding 
the prospects for significant environmental and societal improvements, public and 
governmental discourses remain principally fixed on the challenges and concerns over 
environmental and safety assessments of GMOs and how to manage and regulate them.  
Different approaches towards GMOs at internal and external level could prove 
problematic during the UK͛s exit process and beyond due to the difficulty in disentangling 
the various competence and obligations. This paper will first assess the more obvious EU-UK 
relationship and to which extent the UK will be required to comply with certain EU 
standards post-Brexit. The main focus of this paper will be on the second section, which will 
discuss the issues arising in relation to the devolved regions with the UK͛s withdrawal from 
the EU. The third section will consider some additional particularities under international 
law. The paper will conclude with the claim that ͚takiŶg back ĐoŶtrol͛ does not simply imply 
regaining competences from Brussels but also the possibility of pre-empting devolved 
powers by Westminster, which can be seen as a rather unfortunate side-effect of Brexit. 
 
Compliance with EU Standards 
Despite the UK͛s withdrawal from the EU, the requirement to comply with certain EU 
standards will not automatically cease with its membership. Instead, EU legislation will 
continue to influence the UK legal framework beyond Brexit and, depending on the 
relationship the UK decides to have with its European neighbours post-Brexit, this will 
determine the level of compliance required.13 In particular, any trading with the EU will only 
be possible if the UK agrees to be bound by certain obligations, irrespective of whether this 
is supported by an additional free trade agreement. 
                                                 
10 More specifically, there are disputed adverse effects of GMOs. First, in relation to humans because of the 
unknown long-term effects of consuming GM foods (including nutritional differences and allergic reactions). 
Second, there are environmental impacts both in relation to the environment per se (the development of 
super weeds, out-competition of native plants, biodiversity reduction) and effects to other organisms within 
the ecosystem. For instance, crops modified to kill certain pests could be toxic to non-target species. See e.g. 
the following US case, In re StarLink Corn Products Liability Litigation 212 F Supp 2d 828 (ND Ill 2002); A 
Coghlan, ͚EŶter the “uperǁeed͛ New Scientist (27 August 2005) 17; and L.L. Wolfenbarger and P.R. Phifer, ͚The 
Ecological Risks and Benefits of Genetically Engineered PlaŶts͛ (2000) 290 Science 2088. 
11 See G. Gaskell et al., ͚EuropeaŶs and Biotechnology in 2010: Winds of ĐhaŶge?͛ (European Commission, Oct 
2010). 
12 G. Davies, ͚MoralitǇ Clauses and Decision Making in Situations of Scientific Uncertainty: The Case of GMOs͛ 
(2007) 6(249) World Trade Review 249, 253. 
13 The main options include: access to the single market by means of a Norway-model or similar, an EU-UK free 
trade agreement similar to the EU-Canada agreement, or trading under WTO rules. 
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In general, the UK will of course be able to set different standards14 from the rest of 
the EU post-Brexit. However, this development may not be obvious immediately but rather 
take some time according to the European Union (Withdrawal) Bill (hereinafter Withdrawal 
Bill).15 The Withdrawal Bill suggests that all EU legislation will initially be retained by being 
incorporated into the national legal framework once the UK has left the EU.16 After the UK͛s 
exit, it will be for the national courts (by means of judicial interpretation)17 and the 
Government (through new legislation)18 to amend and/or repeal those laws on an ad hoc 
basis if they are no longer desired. Given the example of environmental protection, this 
would mean that existing EU environmental law will initially continue to have effect in the 
UK, thus ensuring legal certainty in the short term after exit. In the long term however, the 
UK could choose to depart from the European framework, by setting its own standards for 
protection. Further, principles of EU environmental policy will not be part of retained EU 
law. This means that a so-called ͚cornerstone͛ of EU environmental policy will be absent.19 
Principles, such as the precautionary principle, which is of central relevance to the EU 
governance of GMOs, would not necessarily continue to play a role in UK environmental 
protection. Hence, despite giving the impression of a slow and considered departure from 
the EU, the Withdrawal Bill in effect means all EU-derived laws can be repealed at any time 
after the UK͛s EU exit. The domestication of EU legislation could therefore be seen as some 
form of ͚ǁiŶdoǁ dressiŶg͛ and ultimately with no legal weight, resulting in a lack of legal 
certainty which may have significant implications on businesses and individuals alike. 
Any actual divergence in legal standards between the UK and the EU will become 
more visible in the next decade or so. The extent of this and the exact particularities will 
have important ramifications for a potential trade deal with the EU after Brexit. Any such 
agreement with the Union will inter alia require compliance with high environmental 
standards. The UK could strengthen its environmental protection standards and establish 
itself as a leader in the field. At the bare minimum, UK standards have to be similar to those 
of the EU. For example, this can be seen with the most recently negotiated international 
free trade agreement between the EU and Canada (the Canada-EU Comprehensive and 
Economic Trade Agreement, otherwise referred to as CETA). Here, Canada was able to 
guarantee the protection of European standards in agriculture and environmental law which 
was one of the essential aspects for the agreeŵeŶt͛s successful conclusion. For example, 
according to Article 25.2 of the agreement, the parties merely agree to cooperation and 
information exchange in relation to biotechnological products, including GMOs, which does 
not undermine the EU͛s high standards in this area. In contrast, the failure of negotiations 
for a free trade agreement with the US (Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership, 
                                                 
14 Most likely this will amount to lowering standards in areas, such as environmental protection and 
agriculture, see e.g. C. Hilson, ͚The Impact of Brexit on the Environment: Exploring the Dynamics of a Complex 
‘elatioŶship͛ (2017) Transnational Environmental Law (in press). 
15 Bill to Repeal the European Communities Act 1972 and make other provisions in connection with the 
withdrawal of the United Kingdom from the EU, 2017, available online 
<https://services.parliament.uk/bills/2017-19/europeanunionwithdrawal.html>. 
16 Ibid, clause 3. 
17 Ibid, clause 6. 
18 Ibid, clause 7. 
19 See in particular, Art 191(2) TFEU which sets the five principles of EU environmental policy: a high level of 
protection, the preventive principle, the precautionary principle, the proximity principle and the polluter pays 
principle. 
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otherwise referred to as TTIP)20 can be largely attributed to the risk of non-compliance with 
and therefore potential undercutting of such EU standards on the American market, which 
has faced significant opposition before being abandoned.21 Therefore, it can be presumed 
that any potential trade agreement between the UK and the EU will require compliance 
with EU standards irrespective of the UK͛s development in certain areas. Access to the EU 
single market can and will be restricted if such a compliance cannot be guaranteed or seems 
uncertain from a European perspective. 
However, even if the UK is able to guarantee compliance with certain EU standards 
post-Brexit, the negotiation of a potential free trade agreement with the EU is far from 
being straight-forward. In general, EU competences in the areas of agriculture and 
environment are shared with the Member States according to Article 4(2) Treaty on the 
Functioning of the EU (TFEU). While this means that the Union is able to pre-empt Member 
“tates͛ competences according to Article 2(2) TFEU,22 and that it has extended exclusive 
competences in the external sphere to conclude international (trade) agreements according 
to Article 3(2) TFEU, the Court of Justice recently held in its Opinion 2/1523 that complex free 
trade agreements covering a multitude of different policy areas can only be concluded 
jointly with the Member States.24 The significance of this cannot be overstated as a joint 
action between the Union and its Member States requires the latter͛s ratification of such an 
agreement by approval in their national parliaments, governments, or even regional 
parliaments and chambers. As was seen in the initial veto against CETA of the regional 
parliament of Wallonia in Belgium inter alia due to concerns over environmental 
standards,25 a single region may very well jeopardise years of complex trade negotiations 
with a third country. In particular in the area of environmental protection, Member States 
are allowed to adopt more stringent measures than in the rest of the EU territory according 
to Article 193 TFEU and in compatibility with wider treaty obligations. Subsequently, 
Member States have an interest in ensuring their standards are not being undermined by 
non-EU countries. 
Therefore, as can be expected, a potential UK trade deal with the EU will certainly 
face some opposition within the Member States which may also be politically motivated in 
the immediate aftermath of the UK͛s exit. An involvement of Member States can be 
                                                 
20 See the negotiating texts in TTIP, available online 
<http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index.cfm?id=1230>. 
21 See the European CitizeŶs͛ Initiative ͚“TOP TTIP͛ which the Commission initially refused to register in 2014. 
This refusal was successfully challenged in Case T-754/14, Michael Efler and Others v European Commission, 
EU:T:2017:323, where the court held that the Commission should have allowed the registration of this 
initiative. On 10 July 2017, the initiative has been formally registered, <http://europa.eu/rapid/press-
release_IP-17-1872_en.htm>. 
22 Under the EU͛s shared competences, Member States can exercise their competences only ͚to the extent that 
the Union has not exercised its ĐoŵpeteŶĐe͛ or ͚to the extent that the Union has decided to cease exercising 
its ĐoŵpeteŶĐe͛, art 2(2) TFEU. 
23 Opinion 2/15, Free Trade Agreement between the European Union and the Republic of Singapore (EUSFTA), 
EU:C:2017:376. 
24 It has to be noted though that the court found aspects of social and environmental protection of the EUSFTA 
agreement to be covered by the EU͛s exclusive competence under Art 3(1)(e), see para 166 of the opinion. 
25 ͚“top CETA: IEW salue la détermination du Gouvernement ǁalloŶ͛, Fédération Inter-Environnement 
Wallonie des associations au service de l͛eŶǀiroŶŶeŵent (20 Oct 2016) 
<http://www.iewonline.be/spip.php?article7913>. 
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circumvented by concluding (multiple) less complex agreements focusing on specific aspects 
and policy areas only, therefore falling under the EU͛s exclusive competences as was held in 
Opinion 3/15 in relation to the Marrakesh Treaty.26 Here, the agreement concerned a 
relatively narrow area of law – the access to published works for persons who are blind, 
visually impaired, or otherwise print disabled – as opposed to the broader scope of 
international trade agreements. The court was therefore able to deduce an exclusive 
competence for the Union according to Article 3(2) TFEU as other shared competences were 
not affected.27 In any case, such an agreement still requires consent of the European 
Parliament and the Council for its ratification in order to ensure that EU standards are being 
sufficiently protected and complied with, or otherwise it might not withstand judicial 
scrutiny by the European courts.28 
 
Devolved Issues 
Decentralisation or further Centralisation? 
The repatriation of powers from the EU to the UK on matters of environmental protection 
and agriculture poses certain problems as these constitute sectors where powers have been 
devolved to the Northern Ireland Assembly, the Scottish Parliament and the National 
Assembly for Wales.29. By means of the EU͛s principle of subsidiarity,30 the devolved regions 
have become direct administrators and beneficiaries of the EU͛s common policies in these 
areas.31 Subsidiarity stipulates that action should be taken closer to citizens, which is at the 
lowest possible level and at the highest level as necessary in order to be efficient.32 This 
meant that during the UK͛s EU membership, certain EU powers falling under the devolved 
areas of agriculture or environmental protection were in fact exercised by the devolved 
regions. Arguably, the UK͛s exit should not have any greater implications on the current 
status of devolution as the devolved settlements remain intact unless amended, since they 
are not dependant on the UK͛s membership within the EU. Powers in the areas of 
agriculture and environmental protection should therefore remain with the devolved 
                                                 
26 Opinion 3/15, Marrakesh Treaty, EU:C:2017:114. 
27 Ibid., at para 129. 
28 See, most recently, the European Đourt͛s decision on exchange of passenger data between the EU and 
Canada, Opinion 1/15, Draft agreement between Canada and the European Union, EU:C:2017:592. 
29 See the devolved settlements and the Devolution Memorandum of Understanding and Supplementary 
Agreements (2012).  See more generally, e.g. J. Hunt, ͚DeǀolutioŶ͛ in M. Dougan (ed.), The UK After Brexit: 
Legal and Policy Challenges (Insentia: Cambridge, 2017) 35. 
30 Art 5 TEU. The principle of subsidiarity was implemented by the Maastricht Treaty.  
31 See e.g. R. Hrbek, ͚The role of the regions in the EU and the principle of suďsidiaritǇ͛ (2003) 38(2) The 
International Spectator 59. 
32 According to Article 5 TEU, ͚iŶ areas which do not fall within its exclusive competence, the Union shall act 
only if and in so far as the objectives of the proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member 
States, either at central level or at regional and local level, but can rather, by reason of the scale or effects of 
the proposed action, be better achieved at Union leǀel͛. For more on subsidiarity, see e.g. A. Estella, The EU 
Principle of Subsidiarity and its Critique (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 2002); and L. Hooghe and G. Marks, 
Multi-level Governance and European Integration (Rowman & Littlefield: Lanham, 2001).  
7 
administrations. However, it is questionable whether the UK government will take the risk 
of a fragmented British market after Brexit which could weaken the economy even further. 
The dynamics and relationships between the different levels of governance within 
the UK suggest different scenarios. Under a first scenario of agricultural/environmental 
federalism, certain competences will need to remain centralised in order to guarantee 
minimum thresholds. This is a situation where the central government of the UK would 
effectively substitute itself to the EU. For instance, reporting obligations deriving from 
multilateral environmental agreements that are currently undertaken by the EU (on behalf 
of the Member States) would then be carried out by the central government.33 Under a 
second scenario, powers currently shared between the EU and the devolved administrations 
should rightfully come back to the devolved administrations. Here, the governments and 
administrations of the devolved administrations would be under the duty to carry out 
actions and obligations (including the full reporting). In the latter case, the devolved 
administrations could face a lack of financial, human and time resources to adjust to these 
new obligations. Thus, a centralisation to maximise the powers of the UK government would 
strengthen UK integration,34 whilst decentralisation could be detrimental to UK interests in 
the short term. 
According to paragraph 2 of schedule 2 of the Withdrawal Bill, ͚no regulation may be 
made ;…Ϳ by a devolved authority unless every provision of them is within the devolved 
competence of the devolved authoritǇ.͛35 The idea of qualifying and distinguishing within 
competences could prove difficult. Creating sectors and divisions within a single power that 
is devolved would be problematic. On the question of whether a power is devolved, the 
Supreme Court is limited to a ͚Ǉes͛ or ͚Ŷo͛ answer.36 In other words, even if a regulatioŶ͛s 
content merely touches upon powers held by the central UK government, devolved 
administrations would be denied their competence in the matter. Essentially, this could lead 
to a potential shift in competences in the course of the repatriation of powers from the EU if 
the central UK government fails to fully return them to the devolved regions. Ultimately 
therefore, devolved powers may be pre-empted in a post-Brexit UK to the very detriment of 
sensitive region-specific concerns, such as the environment or agriculture. As could be 
argued, it is rather likely that this will cause lengthy battles over the delimitation of 
competences in these domains to the ultimate detriment of the devolved areas,37 and thus 
their current status as beneficiaries under EU law. 
 
                                                 
33 Reporting requirements are present for instance in the 1989 Basel Convention on the Control of 
Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and Their Disposal; the 1992 United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change; and the 1987 Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer. 
34 Please see a similar point made in relation to the EU Commission acting as a ͚ĐoŵpeteŶĐe maximiser͛ to 
ensure EU integration. See F. Randour, C. Janssens and T. Delreux, ͚The Cultivation of Genetically Modified 
Organisms in the European Union: a Necessary Trade-Off?͛ (2014) 52 JCMS 1307, 1307. 
35 Emphases added. 
36 Agricultural Sector (Wales) Bill – Reference by the Attorney General for England and Wales [2014] UKSC 43.  
For a comment of the case, see e.g. A. Sherlock, ͚“upreŵe Court ruling on Welsh legislatioŶ͛, UK Constitutional 
Law Blog (30 July 2014) <https://ukconstitutionallaw.org/2014/07/30/ann-sherlock-supreme-court-ruling-on-
welsh-legislation/>. 
37 See e.g. short commentary by R. Percival, ͚Hoǁ Brexit could break deǀolutioŶ͛ (2017) The Conversation, 
available online <https://theconversation.com/how-brexit-could-break-devolution-74106>. 
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Devolution and the new Article 26b 
As noted above, powers for agriculture and environmental protection have been devolved 
to the Northern Ireland Assembly, the Scottish Parliament and the National Assembly for 
Wales. A clear illustration of these powers resides in the ability for the devolved regions to 
seek restrictions on the cultivation of GMOs within their territories under the Deliberate 
Release Directive.38 There are three provisions dealing with the exclusion or restriction of 
GMO cultivation available to Member States: the safeguard clause under Article 23, which 
allows a Member State to ban GMOs if there are risks to human health and the environment 
based on new scientific evidence; Article 26a on coexistence; and the new Article 26b on the 
restriction or prohibition of GM cultivation (also called the opt-out clause). Article 26b was 
introduced by Directive 2015/412 and shall be the focus of discussion here as it exemplifies 
the different approaches towards GMOs across the UK.39 
Directive 2015/412 came into force in April 2015 and solved a profound division 
among the Member States as well as within Member States. The newly established Article 
26b provides a distinctive and original solution to the deadlock for approving GMOs. It gives 
flexibility and a certain autonomy to Member States and their regions to decide on whether 
to ban the cultivation of GMOs on (part of) their territory.40 The new article is in accordance 
with the principle of subsidiarity and the 2000 White Paper on Governance41 without 
jeopardising the functioning of the authorisation procedure at EU level. The new article 
gives ͚rights to local and regional self-determination – with regard to their landscapes, 
ecosystems, agricultural practices, food traditions and future economic development͛.42 
Under the new Article 26b, Member States have been given the rights to restrict or 
prohibit the cultivation of GMOs on their territory under two specific steps: a pre- and a 
post-authorisation stage. Under the new ͚pre-authorisation geographical scope restriĐtioŶ͛ 
stage, a Members State is able, before the authorisation of a GMO or during the renewal of 
its authorisation, to request the applicant company, via the Commission, to specify in the 
application that a specific GMO cannot be cultivated on all or part of its territory – without 
having to provide any justification.43 This is why, under this first stage, the Commission has 
been tasked with encouraging the dialogue between the Member States and the applicant. 
                                                 
38 See Directive 2001/18/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on the Deliberate Release into the 
Environment of Genetically Modified Organisms and repealing Council Directive 90/220/EEC [2001] OJ L106/1 
(hereinafter the Deliberate Release Directive). Further, the GMO framework is complemented by the 
Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 September 2003 on 
Genetically Modified Food and Feed [2003] OJ L268/1; Regulation (EC) 1830/2003 of the European Parliament 
and of the Council of 22 September 2003 concerning the Traceability and Labelling of Genetically Modified 
Organisms and the Traceability of Food and Feed Products produced from Genetically Modified Organisms and 
amending Directive 2001/18/EC [2003] OJ L268/24. 
39 Directive 2015/412 amended the Deliberate Release Directive. See art 26b as amended by Directive (EU) 
2015/412 of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Directive 2001/18/EC as regards the 
possibility for the Member States to restrict or prohibit the cultivation of genetically modified organisms 
(GMOs) in their territory [2015] OJ 68/1. 
40 See e.g. M. Lee, ͚GMOs in the internal market: new legislation on national fleǆiďilitǇ͛ (2016) 79 MLR 317. 
41 European Commission, ͚White Paper on European GoǀerŶaŶĐe͛ COM (2001), 428 final. 
42 L Levidow and K Boschert, ͚CoeǆisteŶĐe or contradiction? GM crops versus alternative agricultures in Europe͛ 
(2008) 39 Geoforum 174, 185. 
43 Art 26(b)(1), Deliberate Release Directive. 
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As such, the Commission becomes an intermediary between the biotech company and the 
Members States. Importantly, it can be wondered whether this is actually the role the 
Commission should undertake as it appears to be more of a lobbying role than acting as 
͚GuardiaŶ of the Treaties͛ and promoting the general interest of the EU. The amendment 
has been called a win-win deal by the Commission and certain Member States.44 
The option to adjust the geographical scope of the authorisation system constitutes 
a major and decisive change in EU policy for GMOs. For the first time, Member States are 
given the opportunity to restrict partially or completely trade in GMOs without having to 
substantiate their decision – especially without having to base their decision on scientific 
evidence. The first stage has received a wide uptake from Member States and their regions. 
As of yet, nineteen Members States (or their regions) have used this opt-out clause.45 
Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland have taken this option straight away – albeit under 
the similar transitional Article 26c.46 In contrast, England has not adopted the same policy 
choice in relation to GMO cultivation. The divergent decisions between the four nations of 
the UK seem to have been supported by a more environmentally-friendly approach to 
farming, food and environmental protection in the devolved areas.47 As stated at the time 
by the Wales͛ Deputy Minister for Farming and Food, the ban will allow the protection of 
the ͚significant investment we have made in our organic sector and safeguard the 
agricultural land in Wales that is managed under voluntary agri-environment schemes͛.48 
However, these decisions could be considered as protectionist as they restrict trade in 
GMOs. 
Quite controversially, still under this first step, the biotech company can either 
accept or reject to adjust the scope of its application according to the Members “tate͛s 
request.49  Schimpf, a food campaigner for Friends of the Earth Europe, noted that 
governments should not have to ask the permission to ban unwanted GM crops from the 
                                                 
44 Euractiv, ͚MEPs Approve National Ban on GM Crops CultiǀatioŶ͛ (13 January 2015) 
<http://www.euractiv.com/sections/agriculture-food/meps-approve-national-ban-gm-crops-cultivation-
311221>. 
45 For the opt-outs of Member States (and regions), see European Commission, ͚‘estriĐtioŶs of Geographical 
Scope of GMO Applications/Authorisations: Member States Demands and OutĐoŵes͛ 
<https://ec.europa.eu/food/plant/gmo/authorisation/cultivation/geographical_scope_en>. 
46 Ibid. 
47 Since 2010, Defra has authorised seven GM crops to be released for research and development purposes 
under the Deliberate Release Directive. See UK Government, ͚GeŶetiĐallǇ Modified Organisms: List of Current 
CoŶseŶts͛ (2017), available online <https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/genetically-modified-
organisms-list-of-current-consents>. In the UK, since the election of the Conservative Government in 2010, a 
pro-biotech stance has developed. For more see, e.g. L. Petetin, ͚The Revival of Modern Agricultural 
Biotechnology by the UK Government: What Role for Animal CloŶiŶg?͛ (2012) 7 European Food and Feed Law 
Review 296. 
48 Farmers Weekly, ͚Wales Bans GM crops ͞to protect organic farŵiŶg͛͟ (5 October 2015) 
<http://www.fwi.co.uk/arable/wales-bans-gm-crops-to-protect-organic-farming.htm>. See e.g. BBC, ͚GM 
Crop-growing Banned in Northern IrelaŶd͛ (21 September 2015) <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-
34316778>; and Guardian, ͚“ĐotlaŶd to Issue Formal Ban on Genetically Modified Crops͛ (9 August 2015) 
<https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2015/aug/09/scotland-to-issue-formal-ban-on-genetically-
modified-crops>.  
49 Art 26(b)(2) Deliberate Release Directive. 
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companies who profit from them.50 Here, it is evident that the regulatee becomes the 
regulator. Schimpf added that ͚it is unacceptable that companies like Monsanto will be 
given the first say in any decision to ban their products͛.51 To a certain extent, she argued 
that this step undermined EU law and subsidiarity: ͚from now on, multinational 
biotechnology companies will discuss directly with states and negotiate the conditions of 
putting their products on the market͛.52 In contrast, for the then EU Commissioner for 
Health and Consumer Policy, Tonio Borg, ͚it͛s a not carte blanche͛ to applicants because 
they still have to go through the entire approval process under the Deliberate Release 
Directive.53 Nonetheless, it feels as if much of the regulatory power has been transferred to 
the biotech applicant. 
Under the post-authorisation opt-out, which is the second stage, Members States 
are able, by adopting an opt-out measure, to have the final say not to cultivate an EU 
authorised GMO on their territory – independent of the appliĐaŶt͛s views. Member States 
may adopt, restrict, or prohibit the cultivation of a GMO, if their measures are based on a 
non-exhaustive list of grounds.54 This clause creates a balance between an authorisation 
procedure at EU level based on scientific risk assessments and the possibility for Member 
States to simply say ͚no͛ and express the concerns of their own citizens without having to 
rely on scientific evidence or to take into account other Member States. Thus, by allowing 
Member States to protect their national interests, the amendment strengthens the 
democratic process for GMO approvals.55  
Overall, the opt-out clause allows Member States to impose restrictions unilaterally. 
This new procedure provides a ͚diversification through decentralisation͛,56 and gives greater 
power to the devolved regions. However, regions like the devolved administrations ͚remain 
without any independent powers under Article 26b͛ because ͚under the national 
constitutional frameworks [they] remain reliant upon their Member “tates͛ support in 
availing of Article 26b͛.57 This can be seen in the UK where the central government, through 
                                                 
50 Euobserver, ͚EU Ministers Agree Rules Allowing Choice on GM Crops͛ (12 June 2014) 
<http://euobserver.com/environment/124582>. 
51 K.R. Lewis, ͚Miǆed Reaction to CouŶĐil͛s Agreement on GMO CultiǀatioŶ͛ (13 June 2014) 
<https://www.theparliamentmagazine.eu/articles/news/mixed-reaction-councils-agreement-gmo-
cultivation>. 
52 Euractiv, ͚FraŶĐe Wins Greater Control over GMOs, but Comes under Fire from GreeŶs͛ (12 June 2014) 
<http://www.euractiv.com/sections/agriculture-food/france-wins-greater-control-over-gmos-comes-under-
fire-greens-302796?>. 
53 Euobserver (n 50). 
54 Art 26(b)(3) Deliberate Release Directive. The list of grounds is non-exhaustive and includes the following: 
environmental policy objectives, land use, socioeconomic impacts and public policy. Under the post-
authorisation stage, claims must be substantiated under art 36 TFEU and the case-law on overriding reasons of 
public interest; and be proportional. Further, any opt-outs justified under ͚eŶǀiroŶŵeŶtal policy oďjeĐtiǀes͛ 
must not be contrary to the EFSA environmental assessment of the specific GMO under authorisation. 
55 The amendment is in line with President JuŶĐker͛s commitment ͚to give the democratically elected 
governments at least the same weight as scientific advice when it comes to important decisions concerning 
food and eŶǀiroŶŵeŶt͛.  See Euractiv, ͚EU Agreement Opens Door for new GMO Cultivation in ϮϬϭϱ͛ (5 
December 2014) <http://www.euractiv.com/sections/agriculture-food/eu-agrees-bring-back-gmos-2015-
310620>. 
56 M. Geelhoed, ͚Diǀided in Diversity: Reforming The EU͛s GMO ‘egiŵe͛ (2016) 18(20) CYELS 20, 27. 
57 M. Dobbs, ͚AttaiŶiŶg Subsidiarity-Based Multilevel Governance of Genetically Modified CultiǀatioŶ?͛ (2016) 
28(2) J. Env. L. 245, 266. 
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Defra, took upon itself to support the demands of the devolved administrations. However, 
there is no legal obligation on Defra to do so.58 
 
UK Single Market 
Another pathway for the government to intrude into the devolved settlements is to ensure 
the maintenance and functioning of the UK single market to what might seem at almost any 
cost – including taking powers away from the devolved areas by establishing common 
frameworks. Previously, because of the very existence of the EU single market, the UK single 
market existed in and of itself. Divergences between the four nations of the UK could only 
go as far as the boundaries and restrictions set under EU law. As the three-dimensional 
relationship that existed between the EU, the UK and the devolved administrations evolves 
into a two-dimensional one, issues of competences are becoming more potent. In a post-
Brexit world, with the ͚liďerties͛ given to the devolved nations to set their own specific 
standards, trade within the UK could be disrupted and restricted due to the potential 
expansion of non-trade barriers. This is evident in the following statement from the House 
of Lords European Union Committee: ͚maintenance of the integrity and efficient operation 
of the UK single market must be an over-arching objective for the whole United Kingdoŵ͛.59   
To solve these issues, the UK Government could effectively trump devolved powers by 
relying on key reserved powers: trade policy and external relations. The drive towards 
different or even higher standards in environmental protection and animal welfare wanted 
by the government possesses both internal impacts and elements of external-relations; the 
latter being a UK competence. When entering trade talks with other Heads of States, the 
government will have to ensure that goods (and services) entering the UK will not be 
submitted to different policies and regulatory regimes. It is crucial for the government to 
ensure harmonisation and unity within the UK single market.  This practically means that no 
barriers to trade should be created within the UK territory. By having recourse to such an 
encompassing power, this could impact on the actual scope of devolved powers to the 
detriment of devolved areas, which could end up with ͚eŵptǇ͛ powers. Such a situation 
recalls how, for example in the US, the federal state can intervene and regulate when 
required either under the Commerce Clause60 or the doctrine of pre-emption found in the 
Supremacy Clause.61 Such a change would effectively favour GMO cultivation and the trade 
of GM crops within the UK. Thus, as could be argued, the autonomy of the devolved 
administrations is under threat in a post-Brexit UK single market. 
                                                 
58 The Concordat on GMOs indicates that responsibility for the regulation of GMO deliberate releases and 
transboundary movements of GMOs belongs to the devolved administrations within Northern Ireland, 
Scotland and Wales. See Concordat on the Implementation of Directive 2001/18/EC and Regulation 
1946/2003/European Commission, 3 April 2007. However, this concordat, like the Sewel Convention, is not 
legally binding. It is only a soft-law instrument that could come to an end with the establishment of a UK-wide 
framework on agriculture. 
59 House of Lords European Union Committee, Brexit: devolution (4th Report of Session 2017-19) HL Paper, 
Summary of Conclusions and Recommendations, para 26.  See, e.g. Department for Exiting the European 
Union, ͚LegislatiŶg for the United KiŶgdoŵ͛s Withdrawal from the European UŶioŶ͛ (March 2017) 27.  
60 Art 1, Section 8, Clause 3 of the US Constitution. 
61 Ibid, Art VI, clause 2.
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UK-wide Frameworks 
To maintain and support the UK single market, the central government has asserted that 
UK-wide frameworks must be established to thereby guarantee the free trade of services 
and goods across the four nations of the UK.  When looking at the literature on Brexit, there 
seems to be a general consensus regarding the UK-wide frameworks are needed to support 
and maintain the very own existence of the UK single market. However, when scrutinising 
the literature further, there are big discrepancies between the Westminster approach 
(which could controversially be termed an English-focused perspective) and the views of the 
devolved areas, in particular when the relevant powers have been devolved. Supporters of 
the Westminster approach argue that any new legislative framework for agriculture should 
be coordinated across the UK to ensure not only policy coherence but also the effective 
functioning of the UK single market. The Welsh and Scottish Governments agree that 
common frameworks ͚may be needed in some areas͛ but add that ͚the way to achieve these 
aims is through negotiation and agreement, not imposition. It must be done in a way which 
respects the hard-won devolution settlements͛.62 This would entail that the devolved 
administrations have to adjust their policies accordingly and follow the approach taken by 
Westminster. The Agriculture Bill could set minimum standards and thresholds which would 
still allow the devolved administrations to impose higher standards. This situation could be 
similar to the current relationship that exists between the EU and the UK. Questions, such 
as: How much divergence from the central government would be allowed? And would such 
a centralisation of power benefit the environment?, remain to be answered. 
In contrast, the UK-wide framework on agriculture could impose duties and 
obligations on the four nations of the UK. In this instance, the four nations of the UK would 
not be able to depart from the established absolute standards and rules. Such a strict and 
restrictive framework would mean that powers, which are currently devolved, such as 
agriculture and environmental protection, would no longer belong to the devolved 
authorities but to the central government. Practically, the devolved administrations would 
not be able to legislate on or amend provisions and matters that do encroach on previously 
devolved powers if these fall under the remit of this UK-wide bill on agriculture. Further, 
Schedule 3 of the Withdrawal Bill creates restrictions on the powers of the devolved 
administrations concerning secondary legislation. Under this provision, the central 
government has the power to pass legislation that would introduce new ways of regulating 
farming – for instance creating a new system of supporting farmers. The devolved 
administrations have no equivalent power.63  
It seems that devolution will be significantly impacted on during and after the Brexit 
process. The convention states that the UK government will not ͚ŶorŵallǇ͛ legislate in the 
devolved areas without the consent of the relevant devolved legislature.64 Since the Brexit 
                                                 
62 The Scottish Government, ͚JoiŶt statement on the EU (Withdrawal) Bill͛ (13 July 2017) 
<https://news.gov.scot/news/eu-withdrawal-bill>. 
63 Moreover, it is a provision that does not include a sunset clause. 
64 Memorandum of Understanding and supplementary agreements between the UK Government, Scottish 
Ministers, the Cabinet of the National Assembly for Wales, and the Northern Ireland Executive Committee 
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referendum, the voluntary nature of the convention as come to the fore. It is simply a 
constitutional, political convention and accordingly non-justifiable. The (weak) legal nature 
of the Sewel (or legislative consent) convention was confirmed in the UK Supreme Court 
͚Article 50’ or Miller case,65 where the court decided that the convention remained a 
political convention and therefore not enforceable by the courts, despite being 
incorporated into the relevant devolved statutes.66 The statutory recognition, enshrinement 
of the convention in these recent pieces of legislation, did not change its substance. As such, 
Sewel seems to be recognised by Westminster as merely voluntarily binding as a 
constitutional matter, but not legally enforceable – preventing the devolved administrations 
from having a say in any UK-wide framework or other related Brexit consequences more 
generally. To do so, the government requires a legislative consent motion. In the current 
context, it could be argued that Brexit creates an ͚aďŶorŵal͛ situation giving right to the UK 
Government to legislate in previously devolved areas which complicates the repatriations of 
powers and creates legal uncertainty. 
Those wanting a full return of powers to the devolved areas as enshrined in the 
devolved settlements call for the competences that currently belong to the EU institutions 
to be transferred automatically to the devolved areas after Brexit. However, following the 
release of the Withdrawal Bill, Nicola Sturgeon, the Scottish First Minister and Welsh First 
Minister Carwyn Jones confirmed this perspective when they issued a joint statement 
asserting that the Withdrawal Bill was ͚a naked power-graď͛ that returned EU powers to 
Westminster instead of sharing them with Scotland and Wales.67 The category of ͚retaiŶed 
EU laǁ͛ established by the Withdrawal Bill proposes that ͚all such EU law revert to 
WestŵiŶster͛68 – not to Wales, Scotland or Northern Ireland. To undertake this, the 
Withdrawal Bill unilaterally – albeit indirectly – revises the devolution statutes for Scotland, 
Wales and Northern Ireland so that powers will pass over to Westminster. The category of 
͚retaiŶed EU laǁ͛ modifies the competences of the devolved administrations and highlights 
the voluntary nature and legal status of the Sewel Convention. Once the central government 
will have retained powers that should have been returned to the devolved administrations, 
the government will have a wider umbrella of powers available to draft and put in place the 
various UK-wide frameworks. 
Under the pending Agriculture Bill, it is further feared that English farmers would be 
the main beneficiaries of the framework if drafted by the central government with English 
farmers in mind, for instance with the population based Barnett calculation.69 This would 
                                                                                                                                                       
(December 2001) (Sewel Convention). See e.g. Wordpress, ͚Devolution Matters͛, available online 
<https://devolutionmatters.wordpress.com/the-sewel-convention/>. 
65 R. (on the application of Miller and another) v Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union [2017] UKSC 
5. 
66 The convention is now enshrined in statutes both in Scotland following enactment of the Scotland Act 2016 
and in Wales following enactment of the Wales Act 2017. 
67 The Scottish Government, ͚JoiŶt statement on the EU (Withdrawal) Bill͛ (13 July 2017) 
<https://news.gov.scot/news/eu-withdrawal-bill>. 
68 The Constitution Unit, ͚To devolve or not to devolve? The European Union (Withdrawal) Bill and deǀolutioŶ͛ 
(25 July 2017) <https://constitution-unit.com/2017/07/25/to-devolve-or-not-to-devolve-the-european-union-
withdrawal-bill-and-devolution/>. 
69 See e.g. UK Parliament (House of Commons Library), ͚The Barnett forŵula͛, 
<http://researchbriefings.parliament.uk/ResearchBriefing/Summary/CBP-7386>. 
14 
negatively impact on policies strongly entrenched in the devolved administrations, such as 
family farming and rural development in Wales. Any lack of policy differentiation between 
the four nations will have practical consequences, particularly in relation to agriculture 
support, meaning farming subsidies. In addition, the UK-wide agricultural framework could 
drive the production and cultivation of GMOs forward. This could be highly detrimental to 
the farming industry in Wales and Scotland due to the territorial proximity with England and 
the issue of cross-pollination between GM and conventional crops. In such an event,70 
coexistence measures between GM and conventional (including organic) agriculture would 
need to be put in place at the borders to avoid contamination between the different types 
of agriculture.71 Cooperation and political dialogue between the four nations will be crucial 
here. 
Therefore, it can be argued that the UK-wide framework on agriculture, like the 
Withdrawal Bill, appears to recentralise powers that were previously devolved.72 The 
resulting asymmetric, but unequal, relationships between competing UK and devolved 
administrations could be detrimental to the future of the UK. Competition between national 
values and policy preferences could prevent further integration within the UK. Thus, a UK-
wide framework could be beneficial for as long as it allows for differentiation and 
guarantees the autonomy of the devolved administrations. 
 
International Obligations 
Agriculture and environmental protection are transnational and sometimes global matters 
by their own specific nature,73 and as such have been addressed by various international 
conventions and treaties which will continue to impose obligations on the UK beyond 
Brexit.74 In fact, EU Member States are often independent signatories of international 
treaties alongside of the EU, which thereby establishes bilateral obligations irrespective of a 
continued EU membership. Therefore, the effects of giving up its EU membership status 
could be rather minimal for the UK with regard to current obligations towards third 
countries. These international obligations in areas such as agriculture or environmental 
protection will continue to bind the UK in relation to its international partners. Of course, 
the UK may unilaterally withdraw from such treaties imposing certain obligations that it no 
longer wishes to fulfil without additionally being bound through EU membership, as is 
already happening with the 1964 London Fisheries Convention.75 However, such a step 
                                                 
70 See e.g. in relation to cross-pollination, Case C-442/09, Karl Heinz Bablok and Others v Freistaat Bayern 
[2011] ECLI:EU:C:2011:541. 
71 See Commission Recommendation 2003/556/EC on guidelines for the development of national strategies 
and best practices to ensure the coexistence of genetically modified crops with conventional and organic 
farming, [2003] OJ L189/36. 
72 Clause 11 and Schedule 2 paras 3 and 15 of the Withdrawal Bill. 
73 G. Handl, ͚Transboundary IŵpaĐts͛, in D. Bodansky et al. (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of International 
Environmental Law (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 2007). 
74 See in relation to GMOs, the 1992 Convention on Biological Diversity and the 2001 Cartagena Protocol on 
Biosafety. 
75 See e.g. M. Dickie, ͚UK begins to row back from fisheries ĐoŶǀeŶtioŶ͛ (2017), Financial Times, 
<https://www.ft.com/content/12451e48-5db5-11e7-9bc8-8055f264aa8b>. 
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would have severe consequences for the UK as it would entail the risk of further isolation on 
the international scene and possible negative effects on the environment. 
Beyond the EU, membership of the UK under the WTO could be problematic if GMO 
cultivation would be restricted. In particular, the question of the compatibility of any 
maintained opt-outs with WTO Agreements is raised. Any new regime not relying on ͚sound 
science͛ could result in another challenge at WTO level, as in the EC-Biotech case.76 In this 
dispute, the WTO ultimately condemned an EU de facto moratorium on the approval of GM 
products because it established barriers to trade. In light of the UK commitments and 
obligations under the WTO system, any regime that establishes barriers to trade may not 
pass muster under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)77 and the Agreement 
on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS Agreement).78  
A regime restricting trade in GM crops could lead to a violation of UK obligations 
under Article XI of the GATT on the general elimination of quantitative restrictions, including 
outright bans. However, in a potential dispute under the GATT, the UK could invoke Article 
XX of GATT, dealing with the general exceptions to the GATT system, as a justification. If the 
measure fulfils the conditions and tests of the article, compatibility with GATT law would 
ensue. In particular, a justification under Article XX g) based on the preservation of the 
environment could be invoked following the relatively broad interpretation of the 
environmental exception.79 Alternatively, Article XX b) is the exception which relates to the 
protection of human, animal, plant life or health. It could be used by the UK to ensure the 
protection of the environment and public health.  Finally, exception a) of Article XX could be 
invoked by the UK to defend the measures as ͚necessary to protect public morals͛ if 
demonstrably a large majority of British citizens are against GMOs.80 
Further, under the SPS Agreement,81 any restriction not based on scientific evidence 
would be hardly defensible because the agreement relies on scientific justification to assess 
the legality of a measure.82 Therefore, the very fact that currently opt-out measures allow 
devolved administrations not to rely on non-scientific considerations could raise future 
issues as to their compatibility with the SPS Agreement. This could be the case despite the 
fact that states can impose a higher level of protection.83 Effectively, this higher level of 
protection must be scientifically justified. 
                                                 
76 EC-Biotech: Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products, WT/DS291/R, WT/DS292/R and WT/DS293/R, 29 
September 2006. 
77 1994 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, 1867 UNTS 187.  
78 1994 Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures 1867 UNTS 493. 
79 See e.g. US-Shrimp I: Import Prohibition of certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, WT/DS58/AB/R, 12 October 
1998. In the case, the Appellate Body ruled that Article XX g) ͚ŵust be read in the light of contemporary 
concerns of the community of nations about the protection and conservation of the environment, and not as it 
was understood in ϭ9ϰ7͛ and the words must be treated as ͚ďǇ definition, eǀolutioŶarǇ͛; see para 130. 
80 See the role of Article XX a) and its application to environmental trade measures in the EC–Measures 
Prohibiting the Importation and Marketing of Seal Products WT/DS400/AB/R, WT/DS401/AB/R, 22 May 2014. 
81 Under the agreement, SPS measures aim at the protection of human, animal or plant life or health. The 
agreement elaborates on GATT Article XX b). See Preamble, SPS Agreement  
82 Arts 2.2 and 5.2 SPS Agreement. Without sufficient scientific evidence, SPS measures cannot be maintained. 
However, provisional measures based on insufficient scientific evidence can be maintained under Article 5.7 – 
indicating certain presence of precaution within the agreement. See e.g. 2006 EC-Biotech case. 
83 Arts 3.3 and 4.1 of the SPS Agreement. 
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As can be seen, disentangling from the broader EU obligations will by no means 
generate unlimited freedom for the UK with regard to its international obligations. 
Nevertheless, the international architecture of environmental and agricultural related laws 
does not compare to the rather detailed and legally enforceable framework provided under 
the EU. Therefore, regarding its future obligations, the UK will be more flexible to define its 
own agenda without the formal constraints of EU membership. Introducing lower standards 
in agriculture or environmental protection could render the UK more attractive as a trading 
partner for some countries such as the US or China, which consider high EU standards (in 
particular in relation to GMO exports to the EU) an obstacle for trade negotiations and the 
successful conclusion of international agreements.84 However, such an approach could 
alienate other existing trading partners which rely on a continued upholding of higher 
standards with their investments and trade. 
In addition, the so-called ͚Brussels effeĐt͛ by which international partners tend to 
align their standards to those of the EU,85 may ultimately influence the UK͛s behaviour to 
the extent that the UK might be unable to deviate too far from the much-contended EU 
approach.86 In fact, this might play a role not only when negotiating a trade deal directly 
with the EU, but also when trading with other third countries under WTO rules for instance. 
This concept of extraterritoriality of EU legislation and standards can also be viewed in other 
areas87 and highlights the EU͛s influence and market power on a global scale. Therefore, the 
UK͛s positioning after Brexit cannot be seen as an isolated figure following an anti-EU 
approach at all cost, but rather has to reflect a sensitive alignment to such customs and 
constraints at international level within the margins available in order to ensure a successful 
trading strategy can be applied. 
 
Concluding Remarks 
Originally, many thought that Brexit would lead to further powers coming back from the EU 
to the UK and increased UK sovereignty.88 Indeed, the slogan ͚take back ĐoŶtrol͛ became the 
symbol of the Brexit campaign. However, the complexity and inter-connections between 
legal norms at national and international level reject such an over-simplified picture. Rather, 
in an attempt to disentangle the various competences and obligations a much more 
nuanced conclusion has to be drawn. 
Externally, ͚takiŶg back ĐoŶtrol͛ will not provide the UK with unlimited freedom on 
its strategy in international trade, agriculture or environmental protection. International 
                                                 
84 See e.g. the failed TTIP. 
85 A Bradford, ͚The Brussels EffeĐt͛ (2015) 107(1) Northwestern University Law Review 1. 
86 See discussion in I. Hadjiyianni, ͚The UK and the World: Environmental Laǁ͛, in P. Birkinshaw and A. Biondi 
(eds.), Britain Alone! The Implications and Consequences of the UK Exit from the EU (Kluwer Law International, 
2016). 
87 See e.g. in relation to financial regulation, J. Scott, ͚The new EU ͞eǆtraterritorialitǇ͛͟ (2014) 51(5) CMLR 1343. 
88  See L. Fisher, ͚Sovereignty, Red Tape … and the Environment͛, Political Studies Association 
(PSA) blog, 17 June 2016, see e.g. <https://www.psa.ac.uk/insight-plus/blog/sovereignty-red-tape% 
E2%80%A6and-environment>. 
 
17 
obligations will continue to impose restrictions on the UK irrespective of its membership 
within the EU, albeit in a perhaps less enforceable form. In addition, potential trading 
partners will require the UK to comply with certain standards, for example in agriculture or 
environmental protection. This will be the case not only with the EU but also other non-EU 
countries which have closely aligned their standards to those of the EU as a result of the so-
called ͚Brussels effeĐt͛. The anticipated positive effects of applying lower standards of 
protection in order to attract new trading partners therefore have to be carefully weighed 
considering both existing obligations as well as possible negative effects on the environment 
which could lead to a race to the bottom if no legally binding and clearly defined minimum 
standards are established in such areas. 
Internally, the effect of devolved subsidiarity, which is the EU principle of subsidiarity 
applied to the devolved regions of the UK, is under threat in a post-Brexit UK, which 
undermines multilevel governance. As has been observed, powers which the central 
government is claiming back from Brussels effectively come from the devolved 
administrations. The devolved settlements with the devolved regions are separate and 
independent from EU membership and therefore should not be affected by the UK͛s exit 
from the EU. Nevertheless, it remains questionable whether such competences will 
ultimately be returned to regional level or rather remain at national level. Essentially, this 
could lead to a pre-emption of devolved powers which would render certain competences 
granted to the devolved regions under the devolved settlements ͚eŵptǇ͛ provisions. This is 
further evidence of the legal uncertainty resulting from the lack of a written constitution in 
the UK. Overall, Brexit offers an opportunity to renationalise policy choices – but not 
towards the devolved administrations, only towards the central government. 
With the example of GMO cultivation, this paper has shown that the utilisation of 
various mechanisms, like the UK-wide agricultural framework, in order to strengthen the UK 
single market is rather controversial. These frameworks suggest that any differentiation 
between the four UK nations is unwanted by the central government both internally and 
externally. Essentially, this means that devolution is currently seen as a restriction to trade 
and economic growth within the UK after Brexit. Therefore, in the interest of a ͚stroŶg and 
staďle͛ UK single market,89 Brexit has the potential to undermine devolution with the actual 
loss of powers thus to be experienced in the devolved regions.  
Crucially, the current presence of the subsidiarity principle through the prism of EU 
law enables the EU regions to re-establish regional powers that were previously lost to the 
EU and multilevel governance. With a UK-wide framework possibly favouring GMO 
cultivation, however, it appears that the devolved administrations could ultimately have to 
adjust their policies and could lose recently regained powers. However, it is to be hoped 
that when dealing with GM crop cultivation, the devolved areas will be able to maintain 
their opt-out clauses, maintain the protection of their environment and be sensitive to 
citizen preferences.  
 
                                                 
89 Drawing an analogy to the ͚stroŶg and staďle͛ slogan used by Theresa May during her election campaign, see 
e.g. The Conversation (4 May 2017), ͚“troŶg and stable leadership: inside the CoŶserǀatiǀes͛ election slogaŶ͛, < 
https://theconversation.com/strong-and-stable-leadership-inside-the-conservatives-election-slogan-77121>. 
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